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In traditional economics, buyer behaviour is usually modelled under the assumption 
of full information either on prices and their locations within the market or at least 
on the probability distribution of prices in the market. Neither of these assumptions 
seems appropriate in some cases such as when the buyer enters the specific market 
only very infrequently (e.g., markets for durables). This paper studies experimentally 
the search rules that buyers might use in this case of extreme lack of information on 
prices. The paper identifies three general search heuristics, derives three specific 
rules from the heuristics and, using data from a small-scale experiment, estimates 
parameters of the rules. 
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The subject of inquiry in this paper is the behaviour of a buyer searching for a low price 
in a market when s/he does not know exactly what price is charged in what shop. Specific 
emphasis will be put on the case when the buyer enters a market in which s/he has not been 
for a long time. We find ourselves in such situations more often than one might think. 
Looking for a job, for a firm to thoroughly renovate our house, for legal advice, selling our 
house or car, buying a holiday trip or a special drug - in many such situations we enter a 
market that we know very little about because we were there quite some time ago (if ever) so 
that either absolute prices in the market or relative prices among shops or both are likely to 
have changed in the meantime. The study of these cases seems quite relevant - many of them 
appear to be among the most important economic decisions we make in our lives. 
Search for a low price (or a high wage) in a market where the prices differ among shops 
and where the buyer does not know which shop offers which price, is a phenomenon studied 
by economists from various angles for more than three decades. Only a fraction of this 
literature, however, has been devoted to the empirical study of the actual behaviour of buyers, 
mostly focusing on the informationally unique case of a fully known price distribution. A 
1 handful of papers, however, do try to find out what strategies people use when entering a 
market about which they know little. 
The present paper builds on this latter stream of research and tries to add to it on both a 
conceptional level and an empirical level. On the conceptional level, the paper formulates 
three general heuristics of search which are sensitive to all the pieces of information which it 
seems reasonable to use. The general nature of the heuristics indicates the possibility that 
different buyers may either use different general heuristics in the form of completely different 
concrete search rules, or they may use the same general heuristic but still in the form of 
somewhat different concrete search rules. On the empirical level, the paper estimates three 
concrete search rules which are obtained as specifications of the three general heuristics. The 
estimation is based on data from a small-scale experiment. 
Most of us probably rarely (re)enter a market while knowing absolutely nothing about 
it. We usually remember some of the prices we saw there in the past, have some impression of 
price changes which have taken place since then or we have some social network or other 
information sources which we can use to ask about these basic facts before we (re)enter the 
market. This is why this paper focuses on the case where there are two at least very weakly 
useful pieces of information: an old price (the price seen in the market in the past by the buyer 
or by the people s/he asks) and a prediction of how much the prices are likely to have 
generally changed since the time the old price was valid. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II the relevant literature within economics, 
psychology and marketing research is briefly overviewed. Section III identifies three general 
search heuristics and, on their basis, three rules whose parameter values will be estimated 
using data obtained in a small-scale experiment conducted for that purpose. The experiment is 
described in Section IV. In Section V, results of the estimation are reported and the three rules 
2 are compared as to how well each of them corresponds to the data. Section VI concludes by 
sketching ways for future research. 
 
II. Relevant literature 
When looking for findings on the actual behaviour of a buyer who searches for a low 
price in a little-known market, it seems natural to look into three disciplines: economics, 
psychology and marketing studies.  
In economics, the phenomenon of price search has been studied mostly using three basic 
approaches: theory-building, simulation and observation.
1 By theory-building we mean 
mathematical derivation of the optimum search rule appropriate to the assumed situation. 
“Search rule” or just “rule” refers in the search literature to the way the searcher decides at 
each moment during his/her search whether to stop the search or not. “Optimum search rule 
appropriate to the assumed situation” is then any rule which, if used by the searcher in the 
assumed situation, leads to maximizing the expected value of his/her assumed objective 
function. 
Probably the first model of this kind is contained in the appendix of the classic article by 
Simon (1955). It was Stigler (1961, 1962) and McCall (1965), however, who were successful 
in bringing this topic to the attention of economists (for a survey, see McMillan & Rothschild, 
1994, and Eckstein & van den Berg, 2003). As regards the way buyers actually reason, this 
approach - with its emphasis on optimal rather than actual search strategies - obviously has 
little to say. 
                                                           
1 Implicitly it will be assumed throughout this paper that there is no structure in the set of 
options (here prices) that the searching individual browses. Examples of papers in which such 
structure is assumed are Radner (1975) and Wall (1993). Also, attention in this paper will be focused 
on the sequential type of search which seems more suitable for studying the present subject of inquiry 
than the other possible type, the fixed sample size search in which the total number of stores to be 
visited would be determined by the buyer before s/he enters the first store. 
3 Simulation is often used to help find out (where it is too difficult to do so analytically) 
what results we can expect to obtain if we use a given rule in a given situation, with various 
parameters and other characteristics of the rule and/or of the task taking on various values 
from predetermined intervals. The pioneer in using simulation was Telser (1973), followed 
later by Hey (1982), Dudey & Todd (2001) and others. Neither this approach in itself gives us 
any hints as to what rules buyers actually use when searching for a low price. We might view 
as candidates for actual use those rules which perform well under most realistic combinations 
of parameters. This approach, however, makes sense only under the assumption that some 
kind of evolutionary selection pressures are at work in the area of search rules used by buyers 
- an assumption which does not seem particularly appropriate for this area. 
Observational approach seeks mainly to find out what rules people actually use in 
various tasks of the price-search type, or at least what properties these rules have. Several 
approaches in both the price search tradition and the very closely related wage search tradition 
can be distinguished, such as comparative statics (Butler & Loomes, 1997, Hey, 1993, 
Urbany, 1986), statistical regression identifying the correlates of search (Hey, 1993, Kogut, 
1990) and estimation of specific search rules (Butler & Loomes, 1997, Hey, 1982, Houser & 
Winter, 2004, Martin & Moon, 1992, Moon & Martin, 1990, 1996, Schunk & Winter, 2005, 
Sonnemans, 1998, 2000; the present paper). 
Findings of the observational approach within economics are directly relevant for the 
present subject of inquiry. Especially the studies which assume no or very limited information 
on the price distribution and try to estimate specific search rules (Butler & Loomes, 1997, 
Hey, 1982, Martin & Moon, 1992, Moon & Martin, 1990, 1996) can give us some inspiration 
for the identification of the heuristics and rules to be estimated in this paper. The inspiration 
from specific rules dealt with in specific papers will be mentioned later on when we spell out 
individual search heuristics. 
4 In psychology, search for a low price would be considered to belong to the family of 
tasks usually labeled as “optional stopping” (e.g., Corbin et al., 1975, Seale & Rapoport, 
1981, Zwick et al., 2003). Most optional-stopping studies, however, focus on the case where 
the searcher monitors only the relative rank of the observations encountered so far. This focus 
on ranks is perfectly appropriate in situations (such as the usually mentioned case of search 
for as new secretary) where the precise quantitative values of the options are hard to 
determine and only the rank order of the options is relevant. In the present setup, however, the 
focus only on ranks of the price quotes encountered would seem to be somewhat unrealistic. 
Not surprisingly, we can find a number of papers more or less related to the issue of 
search for a low price in the marketing literature (e.g., Beatty & Smith, 1987, Moorthy, 
Ratchford & Talukdar, 1997, Urbany, 1986). Most of these papers are limited, however, to 
identification of correlates of search effort or look at the issue from other perspectives and do 
not try to answer the specific question of what particular strategies buyers use to find a low 
price. 
 
III. Assumptions and Hypothesis 
Search conducted by buyers in a little-known market will be studied here by assessing 
the extent to which data collected in an experiment we conducted support the hypothesis that 
buyers in such a situation search for a low price according to one of several rules. Before 
identifying the rules to be tested, in order to make the topic tractable and to focus on the 
search aspect of the buyer behaviour, let’s introduce several simplifying assumptions on the 
searcher’s motivation and on the whole situation in which s/he searches: 
1) The buyer will be assumed to perceive a need of a constant intensity to get exactly 
one unit of a single good. S/he does not have to determine which goods and how much of 
each of them to buy and under what conditions to leave the market without buying the good.  
5 2) The buyer will be assumed to expect the overall price distribution in the market not to 
change to any considerable degree between the beginning and the end of his/her present 
search. Otherwise the consumer would have to be prepared to solve the formidable task of 
forming an idea not only about the price distribution but also about its rate of change in time. 
3) Each of the shops inspected will be assumed to offer the same single brand of the 
good and thus exactly one price can be observed in each shop; “observing a price” then 
corresponds to “inspecting a shop”. 
4) Apart from the price observed to be charged in a given shop for one unit of the good, 
the first or any further inspection of any of the shops will be assumed to have about the same 
characteristics for the buyer as the first or any further inspection of any other shop. 
5) Each of the prices that the buyer has seen during his/her present search will be 
assumed to remain the same and available for him/her to return to the shop where s/he saw the 
price and buy the good at that price if s/he chooses to do so at any moment later during the 
search. 
6) The buyer will be assumed to know at the beginning of his/her search all facts 
describing the situation in which s/he searches except the price distribution and the concrete 
prices s/he is going to encounter in various shops during his/her search. The facts which 
describe the situation and which the buyer is aware of, include 
a) the “old price”, the price that the buyer remembers from his/her previous exposure to 
the market (alternatively, the price his/her friends or relatives say they encountered the last 
time they were in the market),  
b) the “prediction”, a rough idea of the change in the overall price level that has taken 
place since the last time the buyer was in the market (e.g., based on information from experts 
talking in the media about inflation), 
6 c) the “search cost”, the value of an aggregate measure of amounts of various resources 
that the buyer has to give up and amounts of various sufferings s/he has to undergo to inspect 
any single shop without owning the good yet. Assumptions 1) and 4) above imply that this 
search cost is the same for all shops, including those to which the buyer would return. 
We can now turn to the identification of relevant general search heuristics and then 
specific search rules to be estimated. We will attempt to apply to the present context a modest 
version of the ex ante methodological assumption that underlies most models of decision-
making in economics, namely, of the assumption of (evolved) rationality. More specifically, 
we will concentrate on those heuristics and rules that follow certain intuitive logic (regardless 
of the implied computational simplicity or complexity) which gives a promise that the 
heuristic or rule tends to avoid inefficient search.
2 This includes the assumption that the rules 
do not waste information: they allow for the use of all data which it might be reasonable to 
use in that situation, i.e., any piece of information such that ignoring that piece could in some 
circumstances lead to an extremely inefficient search. This version of rationality is modest in 
the sense that the rules need not be optimal. All we require is that promise to avoid grossly 
inefficient search. 
The empirical literature on search in a little-known market has already suggested quite a 
few rules (a useful list is provided in Houser & Winter, 2004). Through some of these rules, 
summarised in Table 1, three different general search heuristics transpire which can be 
considered reasonable in the above sense. 
 
                                                           
2 We thus do not consider, for example, the possibility that buyers might proceed by taking first 
a limited sample from the distribution and then waiting for a quote which will exceed the best quote in 
the sample. This search behaviour is very simple and may have near-optimal properties (as shown by 
simulations in Todd, 1997) but it does not use all information which it might be reasonable to use in 
the present context and it does not appear to be based on any intuitive logic (the fact that such a rule 
gives quite good results comes rahter as a surprise). 
7 Table 1: Search rules identified in previous research and related to one of the three rules 
tested here 
source label  rule 
Butler, Loomes 
(1997), p. 133  - 
“Set some initial aspiration level and begin to 
search. After each quote, modify aspirations to take 
account of the quote(s) obtained so far. Continue 
searching until you have received a quote that 
allows you to do as well or better than your current 
aspiration level.” 
Moon & Martin 
(1990), p. 182  K 
“Keep searching until a price is found at least one 
standard deviation below the mean, up to a 
maximum of σ/c searches (rounded).” 
(σ is the standard deviation of the known price 
distribution, c is the search cost) 
Moon & Martin 
(1990), p. 183  K* 
“Keep searching until a price is found at least 0.75 
standard deviations below the mean, up to a 
maximum of σ/c searches (rounded).” 
Martin & Moon 
(1992), p. 260  T 
“Keep searching until a price, p, is located such that 
p ≤ 90% m, but with a maximum search cost of 10% 
m, unless minimum p > m + c.” 
(m is average of all prices so far received) 
 
 
Each of these three heuristics determines the reservation price d
*
t, that is, a price such 
that at time t, the buyer using the heuristic considers that price or any lower price to be 
acceptable and any higher price inacceptable. Labelling the search cost expressed in monetary 
terms as c, the buyer who follows a given heuristic will agree to buy the good at time t at the 
price pmt ≡ min{p1 + c, p2 + c, ..., pt-1 + c, pt} iff pmt ≤ d
*
t. The three general heuristics will be 
called Adaptation Heuristic, Bargain Heuristic and Improvement Heuristic. 
Adaptation Heuristic (see the rule suggested in Butler & Loomes, 1997): After 





t that seems to his/her appropriate in view of the newly observed price. S/he 
sets d
*
t somewhere in between d
*
t-1 and pt. 
8 Bargain Heuristic (see rules K, K* in Moon & Martin, 1990, and the first part of 
rule T in Martin & Moon, 1992): After observing pt, the buyer considers all data 
which s/he considers relevant and which are available to him/her at the moment 
and s/he decides how much below the average of the prices being offered in the 
market - whose value s/he must somehow estimate - s/he will set d
*
t so that s/he 
can consider it a bargain price. 
Improvement Heuristic (see the last part of rule T in Martin & Moon, 1992): 
After observing pt, the buyer considers the improvement which is likely to be 
brought about by the next search step. S/he considers pt+1 - whose value s/he must 
somehow predict - worth inspecting only if s/he expects it be lower than pmt by 
more than the search cost of the step leading to inspection of pt+1. That is, d
*
t is 
equal to an estimate of the next price increased by c. 
These three heuristics are sufficiently general to serve as bases for search rules in many 
types of search situations. On the other hand, they are too general to be used directly to guide 
the search in any particular situation - we need to determine exactly how the searcher uses - 
within a given heuristic - the information that is available in the specific search context at 
hand. The three rules that appear below are derived from the heuristics by suggesting, for each 
heuristic, one - admittedly not the only one - possible way to “fill” it with information that it 
would be reasonable to use in the particular situation of buying in a little-known market (in 
other particular search contexts with a different volume or structure of information, the 
heuristics might imply somewhat differently phrased search rules). What is this information? 
When, at the end of each search step, making the decision whether to go on searching or 
to terminate the search, the buyer would certainly be reasonable to compare in some way - 
even if unconsciously or in a very simple way - the prices that s/he thinks the market offers 
and the costs of inspecting various shops in an effort to locate a price that is relatively low 
9 among the prices s/he considers available. Obviously, ignoring what the prices in the market 
may look like and determining the length of search solely on the basis of the costs of search 
may lead the buyer to search far too little or far too much relative to what prices are actually 
available in the market, and the same applies to ignoring the costs and focusing only on the 
prices that the market offers (as in some of the rules suggested, e.g., byHey, 1982). 
When (re-)forming at each moment of the search his/her idea of the prices that the 
market offers, the buyer would certainly be reasonable to take into account (unlike some of 
the rules suggested, e.g., by Hey, 1982, Moon & Martin, 1990, and Martin & Moon, 1996) all 
prices seen so far during the present search - the prices s/he has so far observed during the 
present search are the only direct and thus the most valuable piece of information on what the 
whole price distribution actually looks like. 
Assumption 6) offers two other sources of information which the buyer could use when 
s/he (re-)forms his/her idea on what the prices in the market may look like - namely, the old 
price and the prediction. These data, however, give indirect information only and thus it is a 
matter of personal opinion and momentary circumstances whether it is reasonable to use them 
during the search. Generally speaking, for different buyers, to use these two sources of 
information may be reasonable to a different extent (including no extent at all). 
As to the search cost of a given search step, it is an aggregate of several variables. Some 
of them are the opportunity costs of search implied by the several budget constraints (time, 
money, physical energy, etc.) that every buyer faces and within which s/he must conduct the 
present search side by side with all his/her other activities. In addition, there is usually an 
element of time discounting (e.g., the suffering that the buyer has to undergo when s/he is to 
do without the good for the present time period). There is no reason to distinguish among the 
various types of search cost as to how reasonable it is for the buyer to take them into 
10 consideration - neglecting any of them may lead to a huge gap between what the search takes 
and what it brings. 
As regards the particular search steps whose costs should be taken into account at a 
given point during the search, it is sure that the cost of the very next search step should be 
considered because if its value is very extreme relative to what prices the buyer thinks are 
available in the market, s/he can make an easy decision. But apart from this, there seems to be 
no persuasive general argument for either excluding or including the other search steps’ costs. 
When specifying the rules to be tested, simplicity suggests that we should include in the rules 
the cost of the next search step only (or the average of all search steps, because these two 
values will - for a constant search cost - be equal). 
To sum up, we suggest that the use of the following four types of information might be 
reasonable: 
(1) all prices seen so far, 
(2) the cost of the next search step; 
and the following kinds of information were identified as reasonable to be used under 
some circumstances or in the opinion of some buyers: 
(3) the old price, 
(4) the prediction. 
We suggest that when looking for search rules as specifications of the above three 
general search heuristics for the case of a little-known market on which we focus in this 
paper, all the four types of information that we just listed should have a chance to play a role 
in such search rules. One possible way to do this for each heuristic is captured in the 










11  where    d
*
0 = {1 - φ}p0 + φ(1 + π/100)p0, 
   δ > 0, cmin is the lowest possible value of c, 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. 
In accord with what was said above about the possibility (but not necessity) of buyers 
taking into account the prediction π, it is assumed that the prediction may play a role. In 
particular, the initial idea d0 of an acceptable price is assumed to be equal to a weighted 
average of (1) the old price p0 and a (2) the price that we obtain when the prediction π (whose 
format is, e.g., “20%“) is applied to the old price. 
cmin is a constant whose value is arbitrary except that it should not be higher than the 
lower boundary of the range of plausible values of c. The role of cmin is just supporting - it 
helps to form the ratio cmin/c such that the value of 1 - (cmin/c)
δ is an increasing function of c 
and that is between 0 and 1 for any c ≥ cmin and any δ > 0, as is required if the adaptation is 
always to be stronger for higher c and if it is to lead to dt located between d
*
t-1 and pt. 
Obviously, if we change cmin, the value of δ changes appropriately. 
Bargain Rule: d
*
t ≡ {1 - [(cmin/c)(Vt/Vmax)]
α}Et, 
 where α > 0, β ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0, 
   Vmax ≥ Vt = Σ1
t (pt - Et)
2/t, 
   Et = {1 - [t/(t + 1)]
β}p0 + 
    +   [ t/(t + 1)]
β{{1 - [t/(t + 1)]




t is the price that the buyer views at time t as a bargain. The distance in which d
*
t 
lies below the buyer’s idea of the average price Et in the market is assumed to be the larger, 
(a) the larger is the buyer’s idea Vt of the spread of the prices in the market (because with this 
spread getting larger, the likelihood increases that a very low price will be found), and (b) the 
smaller is the cost c of search (because with this cost falling, waiting to encounter a given 
bargain price gets less expensive). 
12 Vt is assumed to be equal to the variance of all the prices the buyer has seen so far 
during the search. This variance is calculated around Et. Vmax is a constant whose value is 
arbitrary except that it should not be lower than the upper boundary of the range of plausible 
values of Vt.  
The role of both cmin and Vmax is again just supporting - they are used in the Bargain 
Rule just to make sure that the coefficient by which Et is multiplied is an increasing 
(decreasing) function of c (of Vt) and that the coefficient stays between 0 and 1 for any c ≥ 
cmin, 0 ≤ Vt ≤ Vmax, α > 0. Similarly to the impact of cmin in the Adaptation Rule, the value of α 
depends on how we choose the value of the ratio cmin/Vmax. 
Again in accord with what was said above, π and p0 are assumed to possibly enter the 
buyer’s thinking, but this time they take part in the estimation of the average of prices 
available in the market. In particular, the estimate Et of the average of prices available in the 
market is assumed to be calculated as a weighted average of the old price p0 and a weighted 
average of (1) the price that we obtain when the prediction p is applied to the old price, and 
(2) the average Mt of prices seen so far during the search. The weights of both p0 and π are 
assumed to decrease in time - in other words, as the search proceeds the old price and the 
prediction are assumed to lose their impact on the buyer’s idea of what the prices in the 
market may look like and this idea is more and more based just on the prices actually 
observed during the search. 
Improvement Rule: d
*
t ≡ Et + c. 
The way the buyer predicts the value of pt+1 is assumed to be identical with the way s/he 
estimates the average price in the market, i.e., it is assumed that s/he predicts pt+1 to be equal 
to Et. 
The hypothesis is then threefold: individuals searching for a low price search according 
to the Adaptation Rule / Bargain Rule / Improvement Rule. 
13 IV. Design and Implementation of the Experiment 
In the instructions for the experiment, each subject was asked to imagine that s/he wants 
to buy one unit of a good (“first run”) and then one unit of another good (“second run”). The 
goods were described as good S and good T to avoid any real-life connotations. In each run, 
the subject could see up to eight different prices of the good in question, each price written on 
a paper card turned the price-side down so that it had to be turned over to see the price. Each 
time the subject turned a card over, s/he had to pay a “travel fee”. After seeing the price on the 
card, the subject had to turn the card into the original position. If s/he decided to buy at a price 
already passed, s/he had to pay the travel fee too because s/he had to re-visit that shop. The 
maximum number of eight quotes was selected so as to exceed the number of quotes we care 
to collect in most real-life consumer search situations (perhaps except in rare cases where the 
prices differ a lot and search costs are minuscule).   
At the beginning of each run, the subject was also told the value of the initial 
endowment that was reserved for his/her expenses in that run (both for travel fees and for the 
price eventually paid), the old price of the good s/he was to buy in that run, and the prediction 
of how much the general price level (for that run) might have increased since the buyer had 
been in the market last time.
3  
All relevant values for all 24 subjects and for both runs are shown in Table 2. For each 
subject, prices of one of the two goods - we can call that search the “low-price run” - were 
drawn from a price distribution whose mean was about four times lower than the mean of the 
distribution from which prices of the other good were drawn - this other search can be called 
                                                           
3 In the instructions for both runs, the old price was operationalized as the price available 
anywhere before a price liberalization (an event which took place in the early 1990s and which many 
people in the Czech Republic still remember). The prediction was operationalized as the pre-
liberalisation forecast given by experts in the media of the price jump due to the price liberalization. 
14 the ”high-price run”. The means of the price distributions ranged roughly from 21 to 24 
korunas or CZK for low-price searches and roughly from CZK 88 to 91 for high-price runs.
4
Standard deviations as well as old prices for low-price runs are roughly four times lower 
than those for high-price runs. Endowments for high-price runs were roughly double those for 
low-price runs (the ratio was set lower than four to avoid excessive differences in the overall 
earning from the experiment). Both extremes of the range of travel costs are somewhat higher 
in high-price runs compared to low-price runs. Given that the focus of this paper is estimation 
of search rules rather than comparative-static effects of changing the levels of individal 
variables, values of most variables were varied across subjects within the low-price runs and 
also within the high-price runs. 
Already when registrating for the experiment, the subjects were informed by a poster 
that immediately after the experiment, they would receive a turn-up fee of CZK 40 plus their 
earnings in the experiment (nothing was indicated to subjects about how high these earnings 
might be). These earnings were calculated after the experiment as the sum (rounded up to the 
nearest koruna) of the amounts that remained from the initial endowments for the two runs, 
after all travel fees that were incurred during the two runs and the prices that were paid at the 
end of the two runs were deducted from the initial endowments.  
To prevent subjects from making an obviously erroneous purchase once they decided to 
buy the good and thus to save us from the theoretical analysis of the results from the need to 
deal with such mistakes, each subject knew that when s/he would announce that s/he wanted 
to buy the good, the experimenter would make him/her buy it for pmt. 
 
                                                           
4 1 euro is equivalent to about CZK 28. Average nominal hourly wage in the Czech Republic is 
about CZK 110. 
15 Table 2: Input data for each subject 
first run  code  μ  s  π  p0 Nc  code  μ  s  π  p0 N c 
high  price M1S  21.1  3  20 16.0 55 1.50 M1T  88.1 12 20 66.5 120 2.00
low  price  M2S  21.2  3  25 16.1 55 1.25 M2T  88.2 12 25 66.6 120 1.75
high  price M3S  21.3  3  30 16.2 55 1.00 M3T  88.3 12 30 66.7 120 1.50
low  price  M4S  21.4  3  35 16.3 55 0.75 M4T  88.4 12 35 66.8 120 1.25
high  price M5S  21.5  3  40 16.4 55 0.50 M5T  88.5 12 40 66.9 120 1.00
low  price  M6S  21.6  3  45 16.5 55 0.25 M6T  88.6 12 45 67.0 120 0.75
high  price M7S  21.7  3  50 16.6 60 1.50 M7T  88.7 12 50 67.1 120 2.00
low  price  M8S  21.8  3  20 16.7 60 1.25 M8T  88.8 12 20 67.2 125 1.75
low  price  M9S  21.9  3  25 16.8 60 1.00 M9T  88.9 12 25 66.5 125 1.50
high  price M10S 22.0  3  30 16.0 60 0.75 M10T 89.0 12 30 66.6 125 1.25
high  price M11S 22.1  3  35 16.1 60 0.50 M11T 89.1 12 35 66.7 125 1.00
low  price  M12S 22.2  3  40 16.2 60 0.25 M12T 89.2 12 40 66.8 125 0.75
low  price  R1S  23.1  3  20 16.5 60 1.00 R1T  90.1 12 20 67.1 125 1.50
low  price  R2S  23.2  3  25 16.6 60 0.75 R2T  90.2 12 25 67.2 125 1.25
low  price  R3S  23.3  3  30 16.7 60 0.50 R3T  90.3 12 30 66.5 125 1.00
low  price  R4S  23.4  3  35 16.8 60 0.25 R4T  90.4 12 35 66.6 125 0.75
low  price  R5S  23.5  3  40 16.0 60 1.50 R5T  90.5 12 40 66.7 125 2.00
low  price  R6S  23.6  3  45 16.1 60 1.25 R6T  90.6 12 45 66.8 125 1.75
high  price R7S  23.7  3  50 16.2 60 1.00 R7T  90.7 12 50 66.9 125 1.50
high  price R8S  23.8  3  20 16.3 60 0.75 R8T  90.8 12 20 67.0 130 1.25
high  price R9S  23.9  3  25 16.4 60 0.50 R9T  90.9 12 25 67.1 130 1.00
high  price R10S  24.0  3  30 16.5 60 0.25 R10T  91.0 12 30 67.2 130 0.75
high  price R11S  24.1  3  35 16.6 65 1.50 R11T  91.1 12 35 66.5 130 2.00
high  price R12S  24.2  3  40 16.7 65 1.25 R12T  91.2 12 40 66.6 130 1.75
Notes:  Subjects are coded M1, M2, ..., M12, R1, ..., R12. 
  Runs are coded: S...low price run, T...high price run. 
 Variables:  μ ... mean of the distribution from which prices were generated 
        s ... standard deviation of the distribution from which prices were generated 
        c ... travel fee 
        N ... initial endowment 
        p0 ... old price 
        π ... prediction 
 
The prices were generated from normal distributions with their left tails truncated at the 
level of the corresponding old prices. All values and the order of the two runs were 
determined entirely independently of which subject they would apply to. 
16 24 subjects participated in the experiment, of which 11 were women. One subject was a 
member of the staff of the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, the others were 
students of the Faculty. All subjects were recruited in the same way: they read posters which 
were posted at several places in the main building of the Faculty, inviting them to take part in 
an economic experiment. 
 
V. Results 
Apart from the turn-up fee of CZK 40, the subjects earned on average CZK 75.90 in the 
experiment itself (SD = CZK 9.6, range CZK 53.0 ÷ CZK 92.30). The total number of shops 
visited and thus the total number of observations that will be analysed below was 128. If a 
subject returned to a previously visited shop, it was always to buy the good there, i.e., it was 
never just to refresh his/her memory. There were 48 runs (2 runs for each of the 24 subjects) 
and so the average number of shops visited per run was about 2.7. In 15 runs which will be 
called “single-price searches” or SPS’s, just one shop was visited (see Table 3), in two runs 
(both by subject M6) all eight shops were visited.  
 
Table 3: Indices of observations in which single-price searches occurred 
       s u b j e c t       

















Note: A star marks the first of the two runs the subject went through. 
 
Some notation will be needed below. i = 1, 2, ..., 128 is the index of the observation 
(while t was used above as the index within a concrete run). The decisions of the subject will 
be captured by variable yi taking on value 0 if the decision in the i-th observation was to stop 
and value 1 otherwise. We will assume that for the i-th observation, the subject determines di 
17 and decides to stop if di ≥ pmi ≡ min{p1 + c, p2 + c, ..., pi-1 + c, pi} and s/he decides to go on 
searching if di < pmi. We will model this setup with the probit technique: we will assume di ~ 
N(d
*
i, σ), that is, ei ~ N(0, σ), where ei ≡ di - d
*
i is the deviation of the actual reservation price 
di from the suggestion d
*
i of the rule. Using label F for the cumulative normal distribution 
function with mean equal to 0 and standard deviation equal to 1, the above assumption 
implies p(yi = 1) ≡ p(di < pmi) = F[(pmi - d
*
i)/σ]. The vector of parameters of the rule under 
study will be generally labelled as ξ. Estimates of ξ and σ will be found through grid search 
aimed at maximising their joint likelihood. The resulting maximum likelihood estimates will 
be labelled ξML and σML. 
There are several ways in which the goodness of fit of probit estimation can be assessed 
for a given rule relative to the other rules; unfortunately, none of these ways can be 
considered superior and decisive (Amemiya, 1981). We will report two such measures, both 
of which are lower for models with a better fit. One will be the percentage of wrongly 
predicted observations. The other one will be the sum of squared residuals weighted by 
estimated probabilities of both values of yi; formally, 
WSSR = Σi [yi - F(.)i]
2 / {F(.)i[1 - F(.)i]}, 
where F(.)i stands for F[pmi - di(ξML)]. 
Unfortunately, neither of these two measures of fit allows adjustment for degrees of 
freedom. This is why they have to be used with caution in cases where the two rules being 
compared have different numbers of parameters. 
Now we can turn to the actual estimates. Estimates (ξML, σML) for each of the three rules 
for all 128 observations
5 obtained in the experiment together with the values of two summary 
measures are reported in Table 4. 
                                                           
5 Starting with estimation of the parameters of each of the three rules on all observations implies 
starting the whole estimation process with the implicit assumption that (a) all subjects in (b) all cases 
18 Table 4: ML estimates for all observations and two summary measures 
rule  αML βML γML δML φML σML WSSR wrong pred.
a
Adaptation  -  -  -  0.07 0.00 25.5 128.33 34.4% (44 obs.) 
Bargain 0.32  0.02  0.06 -  -  5.2  127.94 32.8% (42 obs.) 
Improvement -  2.4  0.00 -  -  17.1 128.52 35.9% (46 obs.) 
Notes:  
aRounded percentage of wrong predictions, 100% is 128 observations. 
  Italics is used to emphasize that WSSR and wrong predictions can be compared directly for Adaptation 
Rule and Improvement Rule only, because the Bargain Rule has one parameter more than the other two rules. 
 
Perhaps the easiest explanation for the excessively high values of σML is that not all the 
decisions made by all the subjects in all the runs in the experiment are generated by the same 
underlying mechanism (a rule of any kind, a specific rule, a specific rule with specific 
parameter values). Maybe the estimates might be made more realistic and better-fitting if the 
whole data-set is divided according to some a priori plausible criterion and if the rules’ 
parameters are estimated separately on the resulting subsets of observations. 
One possibility is to put aside observations which we might suspect to be generated by a 
mechanism different from the mechanism that generated the bulk of the decisions.
6 We could 
probably generate several different stories, each leading us to delete a different set of 
observations. One simple story suggests we should get rid of the SPS’s: SPS’s are those 
searches which were terminated at the earliest possible moment. Perhaps SPS subjects formed 
some prior idea of the price distribution and combined it with some risk aversion, or that they 
had a high unobserved search cost (on top of c), or that their decision to go on or to stop was 
based on some relatively low aspiration level for net earnings from the experiment, etc. 
This reasoning accounts fully for the behaviour of the three subjects (M1, M5 and M8) 
who stopped in both runs at the first price. Also the behaviour of the seven subjects who 
stopped in the first run at the first price but went beyond the first price in the second run is not 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
use the same search rule with the same specific parameter values. Later estimations will try to relax at 
least part (b) of this double assumption. 
6 Obviously, there is also the possibility of separating the low-price-run data subset and high-
price-run data subset further (e.g., according to various characteristics of the subjects) so that for each 
19 hard to interpret simply and yet consistently with the above explanation: they made what they 
might have considered a nice sum in the first run and so maybe they thought they could afford 
to have some fun (and maybe earn more) by taking more risk in the second run. As for the 
subject R4 who saw several prices in the first run but stopped at the first price in the second 
run, closer look shows that we do not need any special story because this subject’s SPS 
actually supports the Bargain Rule as it was estimated and is very close to supporting the 
other two rules. In other words, from the point of view of the rules, this particular SPS was a 
fairly reasonable thing to do and so in this case there is no strong need for an alternative 
explanation. Just one SPS (M10) fits none of the above stories: s/he did some search in the 
first (high-price) run and stopped at the very first quote in the second (low-price) run without 
this stopping being consistent with any of the three rules. 
ML estimates of the parameter values for low price runs and high price runs separately 
(SPS’s excluded) for the three rules are given in Table 5.  
 
Table 5: ML estimates for low price runs only (SPS’s excluded) and high price runs only 
(SPS’s excluded) and two summary measures 
low price runs only (SPS’s excluded) 
rule  αML βML γML δML φML σML WSSR wrong  pred. 
Adaptation -  -  -  0.36  0.00  1.9  38.82  25.0%
 a (14 obs.) 
Bargain 0.28  0.10  0.00  -  -  0.8  47.79  17.9%
 a (10 obs.) 
Improvement - 1.9  0.00  -  - 2.4  44.96  28.6%
 a (16 obs.) 
high price runs only (SPS’s excluded) 
rule  αML βML γML δML φML σML WSSR wrong  pred. 
Adaptation -  -  -  0.09  0.00  15.3  52.87  29.8%
b (17 obs.) 
Bargain 0.33  0.17  0.00  -  -  5.7  54.69 24.6%
b (14 obs.) 
Improvement  -  2.2  0.00 -  - 10.1  52.70 28.1%
b (16 obs.) 
Notes:  
aRounded percentage of wrong predictions, 100% is 56 observations. 
 
bRounded percentage of wrong predictions, 100% is 57 observations. 
  Italics is used to emphasize that WSSR and wrong predictions can be compared directly for Adaptation 
Rule and Improvement Rule only, because the Bargain Rule has one parameter more than the other two rules. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
of the three rules and for each of the two levels of prices we would get several sets of parameter 
estimates. This direction is mentioned also in the conclusion. 
20 The results may be summarised as follows. For both high-price and low-price runs, the 
WSSR score of the Bargain Rule is higher than the scores for the other rules, which speaks 
against the Bargain Rule. Exactly the opposite pattern holds for the proportion of wrong 
predictions. Apart from that, the Adaptation Rule is somewhat better than the Improvement 
Rule in terms of both measures for low-price runs, while for high-price runs, the two rules 
fare about equally well on both accounts. Below are the rules as they read with the parameter 
values reported in Table 5: 
Adaptation Rule for low price runs: 
  d
*
t ≡ dt-1 + {1 - (0.05/c)
0.36}(pt - dt-1), where d0 = p0. 
Adaptation Rule for high price runs: 
  d
*
t ≡ dt-1 + {1 - (0.05/c)
 0.09}(pt - dt-1), where d0 = p0. 
Bargain Rule for low price runs: 
  d
*
t ≡ {1 - [(0.05/c)(Vt/3600)]
0.28}Et, where Et = {1 - [t/(t + 1)]
0.10}p0 + 
                        + [t/(t + 1)]
0.10Mt. 
Bargain Rule for high price runs: 
  d
*
t ≡ {1 - [(0.05/c)(Vt/3600)]
0.33}Et, where Et = {1 - [t/(t + 1)]
0.17}p0 + 
                       + [t/(t + 1)]
0.17Mt. 
Improvement Rule for low price runs: 
  d
*
t ≡ {1 - [t/(t + 1)]
1.9}p0 + [t/(t + 1)]
1.9Mt + c. 
Improvement Rule for high price runs: 
  d
*
t ≡ {1 - [t/(t + 1)]
2.2}p0 + [t/(t + 1)]
2.2Mt + c. 
Tables 6 - 8 may help to get a better idea of how these rules work.   
 
21 Table 6: Values (in the form of rounded percentages) of the c- and Vt-dependent 
coefficients appearing in the Bargain Rule 
         c     
coefficient  Vt 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 
1 - [(0.05/c)(Vt/3600)]
0.28 0.16



























a 16% 15% 13% 13% 12% 12% 
Notes:  
aThe value of c did not appear in the observations to which the coefficient applies. 
 Three  values  of  Vt were selected at which the coefficients’ values are stated:   
 b The lowest value of Vt (among all observations to which the coefficient applies) when Vt is evaluated at 
the ML estimates’ values. 
 c The average value of Vt (over all observations to which the coefficient applies) when Vt is evaluated at 
the ML estimates’ values. 
 
dThe highest value of Vt (among all observations to which the coefficient applies) when Vt is evaluated 
at the ML estimates’ values. 
 
Table 7: Values (in the form of rounded percentages) of the c-dependent coefficients 
appearing in the Adaptation Rule 
       c     




a 22% 24% 25% 26% 27% 28% 
1 - (0.05/c)




aThe value of c did not appear in the observations to which the coefficient applies. 
 
 
Table 8: Values (in the form of rounded percentages) of the t-dependent weights 
appearing in the Bargain Rule and in the Improvement Rule 
      t     
weight  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 - [t/(t + 1)]
0.02 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
1 - [t/(t + 1)]
0.10 7% 4% 3% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 
1 - [t/(t + 1)]
0.17 11%  7% 5% 4% 3% 3% 2% 2% 
1 - [t/(t + 1)]
1.9 73% 54% 42% 35% 29% 25% 22% 20% 
1 - [t/(t + 1)]
2.1 77% 57% 45% 37% 32% 28% 24% 22% 
1 - [t/(t + 1)]
2.2 78% 59% 47% 39% 33% 29% 25% 23% 
 
When the estimation is conducted separately for low price runs and high price runs and 
after apparently alien observations - SPS’s - are put aside, all three rules correspond to the 
data fairly well: the percentage of wrong predictions is below 30% in all cases, well below 
22 50% which we would expect if we were making purely random forecasts of the subjects’ 
decisions. 
The estimated versions of the rules turned out to correspond to the data about equally 
well or differently according to different measures so that it is hard to distinguish between 
them in terms of their relative strength of correspondence to the data. An exception to this 
ambiguity is perhaps estimation on the basis of low price runs only, where the Adaptation 
Rule seems to fit the data markedly better than the Improvement Rule.  
As to the estimated values of parameters, all three rules treat the prediction π as useless: 
both γ and φ are estimated to be zero. The weight assigned by subjects to this supplementary 
piece of information may be rather sensitive to how the origin of it is described in the 
instructions for the experiment. It is quite possible that if we gave to π an interpretation 
different from the one we used (prediction by experts in the media), subjects might consider π 
more relevant and give it some weight. 
The other estimates do not have this extreme character and most of them seem realistic. 
One could perhaps ask whether it is realistic that the rate of adaptation in the Adaptation Rule 
is about 1/4 for high price runs but between 1/2 and 2/3 for low price runs. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
The contribution of the present paper to the existing literature is twofold. First, three 
general search heuristics are formulated which seem a priori plausible as the basis for actual 
search behaviour. Each heuristic has its own logic and is general enough to be usable in 
various search settings differing in the degree of knowledge about the price distribution and/or 
in other aspects. In future research, of course, the heuristics can be further refined and 
enriched with other potentially relevant factors that we have not dealt with in this paper, such 
as a maximum number of search steps (in those cases where this number is limited), perceived 
23 increases of the general price level during the search, increasing urgency of the need for the 
good as search continues, increasing travel cost as additional shops are more and more distant, 
existence of more than one quote (brand) per shop (and therefore per one travel fee paid), 
non-zero probability that a previously spotted quote is no longer available, etc. 
Second, three specific search rules are derived from these heuristics for the special case 
of a buyer searching for a low price in a little-known market. The parameters of these rules 
are estimated, using data from a small-scale experiment, and the goodness of fit is compared 
for the three rules. 
The comparison of goodness of fit has not earmarked a clear winner among the three 
rules. How could this indeterminateness be cured? An obvious next step is to increase the 
number of observations. This may amplify differences in fit among the rules. Higher number 
of observation would also allow us to estimate the rules for various segments of the data. E.g., 
we could cluster the subjects according to which rule they seem most likely to use, or to group 
the subjects according to their characteristics such such age, shopping experience, sex, etc. 
(this might also allow us to predict what type of subject will use what rule). In addition, we 
might try different specifications for the rules. Finally, we could try various other particular 
ways of filling the three general heuristics with the information suggested as reasonable to be 
used. 
A specific problem is the occurrence of SPS’s. It is possible that an SPS is precisely 
what some actual buyers content themselves with instead of using any sophisticated rule, even 
when they have no idea about the price distribution. But if we assume that in real life this is 
an exception rather than rule, the experiment should induce subjects to avoid SPS’s (except, 
of course, when an SPS is consistent with one of the rules). To eliminate thoughtless stopping 
at the first price seen, the amount to be gained by stopping at the first price should be 
24 decreased, e.g., by decreasing the show-up fee (which, however, means running the risk of 
fewer subjects turning up). 
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